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Abstract The historical evolution of four promi-
nent industry clusters is compared: automobiles in
Detroit, Michigan, tires in Akron, Ohio, semiconduc-
tors in Silicon Valley, California, and cotton gar-
ments in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Detailed data are
collected concerning the intellectual and geographic
origins of entrants into the clusters and other regions
to probe the mechanisms underlying geographic
clustering. The main mechanism at work in the four
clusters involves employees leaving established firms
to found their own firms or shape new entrants in
their industry. Questions and policy implications
related to the spinoff mechanism and the mobility of
employees are discussed.
Keywords Spinoffs  Clusters  Agglomeration
economies
JEL Classifications R11  R12  L26  L63
1 Introduction
Why do some industries cluster in one or a few
geographic regions that do not possess any natural
advantages for producers in the industry?
Much has been written about this question in
recent years. Alfred Marshall’s (1920) influence is
unmistakable. Marshall conjectured that firms cluster
geographically because (initially) it is beneficial. The
benefits come in three forms. First, when firms cluster
then labor clusters. The clustering of labor makes it
easier for firms and workers to match their idiosyn-
cratic characteristics, making both more productive.
It may also reduce the incidence of unemployment.
Second, clustering facilitates learning from other
firms, via localized technological spillovers, enabling
all firms in clusters to be more productive. Third,
when firms in an industry cluster it gives an incentive
for their suppliers to cluster there also, thereby
lowering transactions costs and making both the firms
and their suppliers more productive.
All of these benefits, which are called agglomer-
ation economies, are considered externalities. When
firms enter, they confer benefits on other firms located
nearby that they generally do not take into account in
their entry and location decision. Therefore, clustering
will occur to a lesser extent that is socially optimal
without public intervention. Therein lies the interest in
clustering—it can justify proactive public policies.
To what extent is the evidence consistent with
Marshall’s conjectures? This is difficult to assess
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because the mechanisms underlying each type of
agglomeration economy are hard to spot. Take, for
example, technological spillovers. Many years ago
Krugman (1991), who popularized Marshall’s ideas
in modern times, wrote that technological spillovers
leave no paper trail. Subsequent researchers claimed
that citations to patents could be used to track
technological spillovers and endeavored to show that
patent citations are more localized than would be
expected based on the location of producers in an
industry (Jaffe et al. 1993). This mechanism alone
would not support technological spillovers promoting
clustering, which requires a further chain of reason-
ing. But whether the evidence even supports this first
step in the argument has been hotly disputed (Jaffe
et al. 2005; Thompson and Fox-Kean 2005a, b). The
evidence supporting the other two prongs in the
Marshallian argument is similarly limited.
The case for clustering is based on more indirect
evidence. Some studies examine the extent to which
the productivity of firms is related to the concentra-
tion of activity nearby in their industry and other
industries. Others look at how wages, employment
growth, and entry are related to the same factors. Yet
another strategy is to see whether industries in which
Marshall’s agglomeration economies might be
expected to be more important are more concentrated
geographically. A related strategy is to see whether
firms in two industries that trade with each other, use
similar types of workers, or are related through
innovation are more likely to locate close to each
other. By and large, the evidence from such studies
supports the importance of all three of Marshall’s
mechanisms (Audretsch and Feldman 2004; Rosen-
thal and Strange 2004; Ellison et al. 2010; Puga
2010).
The main purpose of this paper is to synthesize
evidence from a different strategy that I have been
using in recent years to probe for the mechanisms
underlying geographic concentration. The evolution
of industries that ended up heavily geographically
clustered is dissected to see whether they evolved in
common ways, and if so, what this tells us about the
determinants of industry agglomeration.
Four extreme clusters are considered. The first
two, automobiles and tires in the USA, emanate from
my earlier work on industry shakeouts. Both indus-
tries experienced extreme shakeouts, which is why
I chose to study their evolution in great depth.
I developed a theory of shakeouts that predicted that
earlier entrants would be more likely to be long-term
survivors in these and other shakeout industries. By
tracking every firm that entered the automobile and
tire industries in the USA, including when they
entered and exited, I could test this prediction
(Klepper 2002).
Along the way data were also collected on the base
location of every entrant in the two industries.
Indeed, where firms were located was key to using
annual lists of firms to corroborate which ones were
continuing producers, which ones exited in any given
year, and which ones were new producers. Automo-
biles and tires are two of the most famously clustered
industries in U.S. history. Everyone knows about the
clustering of the automobile industry around Detroit,
which continues to this day. The tire industry was
clustered to pretty much the same extent around
Akron, Ohio, a small city in northeastern Ohio.
Unlike autos, the Akron cluster petered out beginning
in the late 1930s, but in its heyday it was comparable
to Detroit in being the center of the tire industry.
Originally I did not have any particular insights
into why either industry became so heavily clustered
geographically. On the surface, the experience of
both industries seemed entirely consistent with the
Marshallian view. Then I stumbled across a simple
observation about the automobile industry and its first
great firm, Olds Motor Works, which led me in a
different direction (Klepper 2005, 2007) that will be
elaborated. It also led me to expand my inquiry to
two other extreme clusters. One is the clustering of
the U.S. semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley
(Klepper 2009, 2010), which is one of the great
industrial wonders of the modern world. Every region
wants to be the next Silicon Valley, and every
country would like to grow the next Silicon Valley.
The other extreme cluster that I chose to study is the
cotton garment industry in Bangladesh (Mostafa and
Klepper 2010). In some ways this is an even more
extraordinary cluster than the semiconductor industry
in Silicon Valley. It helped catalyze sustained
economic growth in a country handicapped by
numerous challenges.
These four industries and how they evolved is my
empirical palette. Collecting the evidence required to
pursue the insight inspired by Olds Motor Works
proved to be challenging. It helps define what one of
my colleagues calls my style of analysis. There is
142 S. Klepper
123
macroeconomics, microeconomics, and nano-eco-
nomics, which involves digging below the microeco-
nomic level to understand the evolution of industries.
In the context of the evolution of industry clusters,
nano-economics required me to trace the intellectual
and geographic heritage of the firms that entered the
studied industries, particularly the new firms that
entered these industries. This required identifying and
tracking the founders of the new firms, a task which
required a different strategy for each industry.
Ultimately, what has emerged is a novel theory of
clustering based on the ideas of organizational
reproduction and heredity. The theory raises numer-
ous questions and yields novel public policies.
The effort to collect the requisite evidence was
arduous, and collaborators were essential in my work.
Two were partners in my geographical explorations.
Guido Buenstorf and I collaborated in the investiga-
tion of why the U.S. tire industry became so clustered
around Akron (Buenstorf and Klepper 2009, 2010),
which involved tracing the intellectual and geo-
graphic heritage of all the firms that historically
entered the tire industry in the state of Ohio. Romel
Mostafa and I collaborated on the investigation of the
cotton garment industry in Bangladesh (Mostafa and
Klepper 2010). He conducted the lengthy fieldwork
in Bangladesh that was essential to our investigation,
and that only occurred after over a full year of
assembling and coding archival data on the industry
from his perch in Pittsburgh.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
the histories of the four clusters are recounted. In
Section 3, the ideas inspired by Olds Motor Works
and how they formed the basis for the investigation of
the evolution of the four clusters are presented.
Section 4 describes the effort that was devoted to
collecting evidence to test the ideas. Section 5
describes the tests. Section 6 discusses the results,
raising numerous questions and also discussing
distinctive policy implications of the view about
clusters that emerges from the four case studies.
2 Four famous clusters
One of the earliest great industry clusters to emerge
in the USA without an obvious natural advantage was
the concentration of automobile producers around
Detroit, Michigan. Figure 1 plots the collective
market share of automobile producers located in the
Detroit area every 5 years from 1900 to 1925 based
on data on the output of leading makes of automo-
biles reported in Bailey (1971) and the total output of
automobiles reported by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (1939). Firms moved about and branched within
roughly a 100-mile region in Michigan from Detroit.
Accordingly, the Detroit region is defined to include
all locations in Michigan within 100 miles of Detroit,
including prominent automobile cities such as Flint
and Lansing.
The automobile industry is generally dated as
beginning in the USA in 1895. Curiously, among the
first 69 producers in the industry through 1900 listed
in Smith (1968), none entered in the Detroit area. The
first firm in the Detroit area deemed by Smith (1968)
to be a producer (i.e., a firm that manufactured a car
and sold to the general public) was Olds Motor
Works, which was a successful engine producer that
developed the first really popular automobile, the
Curved Dash Runabout. After Olds, another 109
firms entered in the Detroit area through 1924, after
which entry into the industry was negligible.
Figure 1 indicates that automobile firms based in
the Detroit area captured a rising share of the
industry’s output after Olds’ entry. By 1910, firms
in the Detroit area accounted for 65% of the output of
the industry, which rose further to over 80% in 1925
and subsequently remained high. Not surprisingly
given the size of the automobile industry, Wayne
County, which is home to Detroit, expanded by leaps
and bounds, increasing from a population of 300,000
in 1900 to 1.9 million in 1930.
The most successful of the early Detroit area firms
was Ford Motor Co. It entered in Detroit in 1903 and
captured over 50% of the total market by 1915. In the
1920s, Ford was displaced as the industry leader by
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Fig. 1 Percentage of U.S. automobile output accounted for by
firms based in the Detroit area, 1900–1925. Source: Bailey
(1971), Federal Trade Commission (1939)
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firms built around Buick Motor Co., a Detroit area
producer that entered in 1903. The last of the big
three producers, Chrysler, emerged in Detroit in 1924
through the efforts of Walter Chrysler, the ex-head of
the Buick division of General Motors, to reorganize
two successful early producers that had fallen on hard
times. However, Detroit was a lot more than just
Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, and a number of
other leading firms were also located there.
The pneumatic tire industry was pretty much a
creation of the automobile industry. Pneumatic tires
had been used on bicycles, but scaling them up to
much heavier automobiles presented a novel chal-
lenge that effectively created a new industry. The first
producer of a pneumatic automobile tire in 1896 was
B.F. Goodrich, which had been a successful producer
of bicycle tires and other rubber products. It was based
in Akron, Ohio, a small city in Northeastern Ohio near
Cleveland. Four other early leaders of the industry
also emerged in Akron, namely, Diamond Rubber,
Kelly-Springfield, Goodyear Tire & Rubber, and
Firestone Tire & Rubber. According to the annual
listings of pneumatic tire producers in Thomas’
Register of American Manufacturers, through 1930
over 500 firms entered the tire industry. Ohio had the
most entrants of any state with 126, and 102 of these
entrants were located within 100 miles of Akron.
Figure 2 plots the periodic share of U.S. tire
production accounted for by establishments in Ohio
(mainly northeastern Ohio) from 1899 to 1935 based
on Census data, initially for the combined tire and
rubber industry and then for the tire industry alone
beginning in 1919 when it was broken out separately.
The share of tire production in Ohio increased
steadily through 1935, peaking at 67%. The bulk of
this output was accounted for by Goodrich, which
acquired Diamond in 1912, Goodyear, and Firestone.
However, the next cadre of firms in Ohio also
comprised sizable producers, accounting for around
one-third of the Ohio plant capacity as of 1921
(Buenstorf and Klepper 2009). Similar to Wayne
County, the population of Summit County, the home
of Akron, increased greatly, rising five-fold from
70,000 in 1900 to 350,000 in 1930.
The semiconductor industry was launched by the
transistor, which was invented in 1947 at Bell Labs,
AT&T’s research arm located in New Jersey. Semi-
conductor firms were initially concentrated in New
York, Boston, and Los Angeles. Similar to the
automobile industry and Detroit, at first no semicon-
ductor company located in Silicon Valley. The first
great semiconductor firm in Silicon Valley was
Fairchild Semiconductor, which entered in 1957.
According to the Silicon Valley genealogy, which
reports the founders of all semiconductor firms in
Silicon Valley through 1986,1 over 120 firms entered
in Silicon Valley after Fairchild Semiconductor.
Figure 3 plots the periodic share of the sales of
U.S. semiconductor firms accounted for by firms
based in Silicon Valley from the start of the industry
through 1990. It is based on the market shares of the
leading firms reported periodically in Tilton (1971)
through 1966, and then it is reported in 5-year
intervals from 1975 to 1990 based on firm sales data
compiled by the private consulting firm Integrated
Circuit Engineering (ICE). The graph reflects the
steady rise in the market share of the Silicon Valley
semiconductor firms after the entry of Fairchild
Semiconductor, which reached a peak of approxi-
mately 50% in 1985. Silicon Valley is based in
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Fig. 2 Percentage of rubber and tire production accounted by
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Fig. 3 Percentage of sales of U.S. semiconductor firms
accounted for by firms based in Silicon Valley, 1957–1990.
Source: Tilton (1971), Sales data compiled by Integrated
Circuit Engineering
1 It was compiled by Semiconductor Equipment and Materials
International of Mountain View, CA.
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300,000 in 1950 to 1.3 million in 1980 as the
semiconductor industry increasingly concentrated
there. A number of entrants after Fairchild Semi-
conductor contributed to Silicon Valley’s dominance
of the semiconductor industry, including National,
Intel, and AMD.
Thus, in the three U.S. clusters, over 100 firms
entered in a 30-year period, and the firms in the
clusters grew to account for 50% or more of the total
sales of U.S. firms in their industry. The regions of
each cluster also grew greatly and became inextrica-
bly linked to their industry, evidenced no better than
by Silicon Valley, which derived its name from the
silicon used in semiconductors.
The fourth cluster that is considered is somewhat
different. For one, it was not in the USA but in a poor
country that had relatively recently gained its inde-
pendence, Bangladesh. Furthermore, it involved an
old, low-tech industry, cotton garments, whereas
autos, tires, and semiconductors were new and highly
innovative industries. But like the other three clus-
ters, the growth of the cotton garment industry in
Bangladesh, in particular in its capital city of Dhaka,
was extraordinary.
Before 1978, there was no cotton garment industry
to speak of in Bangladesh. Indeed, Bangladesh had
little industry and was beset by corruption and low
literacy. A South Korean firm, Daewoo, initiated a
partnership with a Bangladeshi who agreed to start a
cotton garment firm, Desh Garments, in the port city
of Chittagong. The South Korean firm was coming up
against international export limits and sought out a
partner to enhance its earnings. Desh Garments sent
126 workers to South Korea to be trained by Daewoo
for 6 months in every aspect of its business, including
the assembly line production of shirts and other
cotton garments. The workers returned to Bangla-
desh, and Desh Garments began production under
Daewoo’s supervision. Daewoo handled all other
aspects of the business, including marketing and
sourcing of inputs.
After 2 years a coup occurred in South Korea, and
the head of Daewoo was forced to leave the country,
which led to Desh Garments breaking its agreement
with Daewoo. On its own it continued to be
successful. A flood of entrants followed Desh Gar-
ments into the cotton garment industry, mainly in
Dhaka. According to records compiled by the Ban-
gladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters
Association (BGMEA), a total of 664 firms entered
the industry by 1988. Figure 4 reflects the enormous
growth of the industry over time and the concomitant
growth of the Bangladeshi economy. Since 1980,
Bangladesh has averaged per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) growth of 5% per year and is on the
verge of giving up its status as a less-developed
country. Its exports have grown comparably, driven
by the growth of the cotton garment industry, which
accounts for over 75% of its exports. Today, there are
over 4,500 cotton garment factories employing three
million workers, with 80% or so of the factories
located in Dhaka.
All four of the clusters were located in regions
without any particular natural advantages for their
industry. They represent some of the most extreme
examples of such industry clustering in modern
times. As such, it might be thought that any lessons
that could be gleaned from the four clusters would be
illuminating about the forces governing the geo-
graphic concentration of industries.
3 A theory of organizational reproduction
and heredity
My thinking about clustering was profoundly influ-
enced by a brief passage in an old book about the
automobile industry by Doolittle (1916), The
Romance of the Automobile Industry. Doolittle
(1916, pp. 44–45) described Ransom Olds, who
headed Olds Motor Works when it entered the
automobile industry in 1901, as the ‘‘Schoolmaster
of Motordom.’’ He claimed that Olds ‘‘probably
trained more men of prime importance to the industry
to-day than any other pioneer’’ and went on to feature
three of his employees that were especially important
founders of Detroit area automobile companies.
This suggested a mechanism that might help
explain the clustering of the automobile industry in
the Detroit area. Incumbent firms are natural training
grounds for the next generation of entrepreneurs in an
industry. Suppose that the better the performance of a
firm, the more valuable the lessons that its employees
can learn about how to organize a firm in the same
industry, which is called a spinoff. The profitability of
a potential spinoff would depend on the lessons
learned by its employee-founder and the employee’s
ability to organize his own firm. If the distribution of
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employees in terms of their ability to organize a
spinoff was the same at all incumbent firms, then
employees in better firms would be more likely to
found (profitable) spinoffs and to have better (i.e.,
more profitable) spinoffs.2 If employees locate their
spinoffs close to their prior location, this could lead to
a buildup of successful spinoff firms around success-
ful early entrants, giving rise to industry clustering.
This idea seemed especially promising as a way of
explaining the clustering of the automobile industry in
the Detroit area because Olds Motor Works was not
only successful itself, but it also played an important
role in the success of three other early entrants in the
Detroit area, namely, Cadillac, Ford, and Buick.
Although Olds had been a successful engine producer
before entering the automobile industry, it subcon-
tracted production of all its parts and focused on
assembling automobiles. Its two main suppliers of
engines and transmissions were two local machine
shops, Leland and Faulconer and the Dodge Brothers.
Capitalizing on their experience working for Olds, these
two firms were instrumental in the success of Cadillac
and Ford, which entered in Detroit in 1902 and 1903,
respectively. Another one of Olds’ local subcontractors,
the Briscoe Brothers, financed Buick, which entered
into automobile production in 1903 in Detroit. Although
Buick was not initially successful, it became one of the
leading producers in the industry after being acquired
by William Durant, a successful wagon producer in
Flint, Michigan who moved the company there. In 1908
he used Buick to organize General Motors.
Thus, the Detroit area was home to four of the
most successful early entrants into the industry. This
could hardly have been predicted. Detroit was a
sizable city, but not especially well positioned to
become the capital of the U.S. automobile industry
given its distance from the main population centers in
the northeastern part of the USA. However, if
spinoffs are key to industry clusters, then the chance
concentration of four of the early leaders in the
Detroit area could well have set the stage for the
clustering of the automobile industry there.
Many questions are raised by this explanation for
clustering. What exactly is learned from working
inside a successful company that is so useful in
starting a spinoff? Presumably something tacit that is
hard to learn without experiencing it first hand. Why
do employees leave incumbent firms to start spinoffs
and how do they manage to succeed in competition
with a successful ‘‘parent’’? Why would employees
locate their spinoffs close to their parent firm rather
than seek out less populated local markets?
These are just some of the questions raised by the
proposed spinoff mechanism. Before trying to answer
them, I focused on developing simple models to
structure what should be observed if indeed spinoffs
were key to industrial clustering (Klepper 2005, 2007,
2010; Buenstorf and Klepper 2009, 2010). The models
assume that firms entering a new industry differ at the
time of entry in terms of their ‘‘competence,’’ which
conditions their productivity. The most competent
entrants comprise successful firms in related industries
that diversify into the new industry and spinoffs of
leading incumbents, who have the most knowledge to
draw on to organize their operations.3 All else equal,
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2 This prediction would be reinforced if better firms also had
more able employees (Klepper and Thompson 2010).
3 Not all successful firms that diversify from a related industry
or that are spinoffs of leading incumbents will themselves be
high-competence entrants; such a background is a necessary
but not sufficient condition to be a high-competence firm.
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including at the time of entry. They also earn larger
profits and thus are less likely to exit due to adverse
random shocks, enabling them on average to survive
longer. More competent firms also spawn more and
better spinoffs.
Industries differ in the value of experience in
related industries and within incumbent firms. Ones
where experience in related industries is of less value
have less successful entrants diversifying from
related industries, which limits the number of
geographic areas with successful firms. But if expe-
rience within leading incumbent firms is an important
source of competence, the few regions with success-
ful early firms are prime candidates for a build-up of
successful spinoffs, thereby fueling clustering.
Based on these ideas, the following patterns are
expected in industries subject to clustering:
(1) Clusters begin with a successful diversifier.
(2) Clusters experience a high rate of spinoffs;
hence the percentage of entrants that are spin-
offs is greater in clusters than elsewhere.
(3) Clusters are home to the most fertile spawners
of spinoffs.
(4) The leading firms in clusters are predominantly
spinoffs of other leading firms in the clusters.
(5) Spinoffs in clusters are more competent on
average than spinoffs elsewhere and other kinds
of new firms, denoted as startups, in all regions.
This should be reflected in a higher percentage
of spinoff entrants entering at large sizes and
surviving longer than spinoffs elsewhere and
startups in all regions.
None of these predictions depends on Marshallian
agglomeration economies. Such economies are not,
however, incompatible with the spinoff mechanism.
If spinoffs spur the growth of clusters, agglomeration
economies would reinforce the growth by benefiting
all of the firms located in a cluster. So if agglomer-
ation economies are influential, not only spinoffs but
also startups in the clusters will survive longer than
their counterparts elsewhere.
The five predictions were used to guide the analysis
of the U.S. automobile, tire, and semiconductor
industries. The analysis of the cotton garment industry
focused on how the industry developed after the
success of Desh Garments. Policies were imple-
mented to allow firms to import fabric without paying
duties and to help finance the purchase of inputs. The
main question addressed by Mostafa and Klepper
(2010) is whether these policies alone were sufficient
to catalyze the growth of the industry or whether key
to the growth of the industry were mechanisms to
diffuse the tacit knowledge that Daewoo had imparted
to Desh Garments about assembly line production.
It was initially believed that spinoffs might also
have been key to the diffusion of this tacit knowledge
and the growth of the industry after the success of
Desh Garments. But Bangladesh’s capital markets
were primitive, and few of the initial workers at Desh
had access to the funds required to start their own
firms. However, the workers were sought after by
entrants to help set up and oversee their production
using assembly line methods. It was conjectured that
Bangladesh’s cotton garment industry initially grew
as these workers left Desh Garments to help set up
production at new entrants, causing the number of
firms capable of competing internationally to rise.
A simple model of this hiring process was devel-
oped to structure what should be observed if the growth
of the Bangladesh cotton garment industry was initially
fueled by the migration of Desh Garments workers to
new entrants (Mostafa and Klepper 2010). A market
was assumed to arise for the Desh Garments workers,
which determined the price of their services. By hiring
a Desh Garments worker to set up and supervise its
production, a firm could improve its productivity and
thus lower its unit cost of production. The larger the
firm, the greater the profits from lowering its unit cost.
Similar to the spinoff model, firms differed in their
innate productivity based on the background of their
founders. Those founded by individuals with experi-
ence as entrepreneurs in other industries and with
greater education were more productive and thus
produced a larger level of output. Consequently, firms
with the greatest innate productivity were expected to
hire Desh Garments workers to set up and supervise
their production, which would increase their produc-
tivity and exports. These firms were concentrated in
Dhaka, so that is where the industry agglomerated.
4 Tracing the origins of entrants
The key to testing all of these predictions is tracing
the backgrounds of entrants and also their perfor-
mance. The greatest challenge is identifying the
backgrounds of new firms, which requires working
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out who founded them and their prior work history.
The sources available to trace the backgrounds of
entrants differed across the four industries, which
necessitated using different strategies to compile the
data. As a result, the same tests of the predictions
could not be performed for each industry.
The industry that could be analyzed most compre-
hensively was automobiles. A great deal has been
written about the industry, in part due to the interest
of hobbyists in vintage automobiles. To cater to their
needs and the interests of others, a three-volume
compendium called the Standard Catalog of Amer-
ican Cars was assembled to provide information on
every company that was even rumored to have
produced an automobile in the USA. The main
volume (Kimes and Clark 1996) was an invaluable
resource to trace the backgrounds of the U.S.
automobile producers listed in Smith (1968).
Between Smith (1968), which also identified which
producers diversified into automobiles from other
industries, the Standard Catalog, and other scattered
sources, the backgrounds of all 725 automobile
producers listed in Smith (1968) from 1895 to 1966
were traced. Based on rules detailed in Klepper (2007),
firms were divided into four categories: pre-existing
firms that diversified into autos, new firms founded by
heads of pre-existing firms, spinoffs and their ‘‘par-
ents,’’ and all other startups. Bailey (1971) was used to
identify the annual leading producers of automobiles.
Thomas’ Register of American Manufacturers, which
beginning in 1905 annually listed the producers of
many manufactured products, including automobiles,
was used to determine the initial capitalization of
automobile producers in Smith (1968) that were also
listed in Thomas’ Register (Klepper 2010).
Thomas’ Register was also used to compile a list
of 607 producers of pneumatic automobile tire
producers in the USA from 1905 to 1981, including
their year of entry, year of exit, base location, and
initial capitalization. For the earliest entrants in
Thomas’ Register, another directory was used to
backdate their entry year as far back as 1901 (Klepper
2002). Various sources, including listings of rubber
and tire machinery producers in Thomas’ Register,
were used to determine which tire entrants diversified
from other industries. Over 85% of the entrants were
not diversifiers, and no resource comparable to the
Standard Catalog existed to trace the backgrounds of
new firms.
To make it tractable to trace the backgrounds of new
firms, only the 126 firms that entered in the state of
Ohio through 1930 were considered. No significant
entry into the industry occurred after 1930, so little was
lost by focusing only on entrants through 1930.
Attention was restricted to the Ohio entrants because
the industry clustered there and more resources were
available to trace the entrants in Ohio than elsewhere.
Buenstorf and Klepper (2009, 2010) used a diverse set
of sources, including trade journals, county histories,
incorporation records, and city directories listing
people and their jobs to identify the backgrounds of
117 of the 126 Ohio entrants. Based on rules detailed in
Buenstorf and Klepper (2010), they were divided into
three groups: diversifiers, spinoffs and their parents,
and (other) startups.4 The county in Ohio (or elsewhere
for the small number of entrants that came from
outside Ohio) from which each of the 117 entrants
originated was determined. For spinoffs and startups,
this was defined as the county where their founders
previously worked; for diversifiers, it was the county
where they previously produced. No comprehensive
data were available on the periodic market shares of
the leaders except for the very top firms.
The two main sources available to trace the
backgrounds and performance of semiconductor
producers dictated almost the opposite strategy than
that used for the tire industry. One source compiled
by ICE provided annual data from 1974 to 2002 on
the sales of all U.S. semiconductor companies whose
sales exceeded a minimum value.5 These were the
most prominent firms in the industry. The other
source was the Silicon Valley genealogy noted
earlier, which was used to determine the background
and year of entry of all ICE firms located in Silicon
Valley that had entered the industry by 1986. The
other entrants on the ICE list and their backgrounds
were traced through Web searches and other sources.
All told, 99 firms on the ICE lists had entered by
1986, and the backgrounds of 92 of them could be
traced. Based on rules detailed in Klepper (2009),
they were divided into diversifiers, spinoffs and their
parents, and (other) startups.
4 Few new firms were founded by heads of other firms, as in
automobiles, so this category was not employed.




Identifying and tracing the backgrounds of firms in
Bangladesh that produced cotton garments was a
singular challenge. After much prodding, BGMEA
provided annual directories of producers beginning in
1990 and a listing of entrants prior to 1990, including
their year of entry. It also provided annual export data
beginning in 1995 for the firms located in Dhaka.
Extensive on-site field work was required to trace the
backgrounds of the firms, which included whether
they were diversifiers and whether they were headed
by a college graduate. This field work uncovered an
annual meeting of many of the original 126 workers
at Desh Garments who had been trained by Daewoo.
These workers provided their work histories and the
work histories of most of the other 126 workers that
did not attend the meeting, some of whom were
deceased. Their work histories were used to identify
all of the early entrants that hired a Desh Garments
worker to set up and supervise their production.
5 Empirical patterns
First the three U.S. industries and their clusters are
considered. Each cluster was expected to have at least
one successful early entrant that was a diversifier. As
already noted, in autos that firm was Olds Motor
Works and in tires it was B.F. Goodrich. Both clusters
also had other successful firms early on, in part due to
the influence of Olds and Goodrich. In autos, Olds’
subcontracting influenced the development nearby of
Cadillac, Ford, and Buick. In tires, Goodrich influ-
enced the development in Akron of Diamond Rubber,
Kelly-Springfield, Goodyear Tire & Rubber, and
Firestone Tire & Rubber, all of which were successful
early firms (Buenstorf and Klepper 2009). Diamond
was an 1894 spinoff of Goodrich that was later
acquired by Goodrich. Kelly-Springfield held a patent
on a carriage tire that it had manufactured by
Goodrich, and when it decided to produce automobile
tires in 1899 it entered in Akron. Firestone was
organized in Akron in 1900, and its first tires were
manufactured by Goodrich, which later supplied
prepared rubber and fabric for Firestone’s own tire
manufacturing operation. Goodyear was founded in
1898 by the son of one of the local financiers of
Goodrich who had his own rubber company.
The early successful semiconductor entrant in
Silicon Valley was Fairchild Semiconductor. It was
not a diversifier but a spinoff, which in part reflects the
unusual circumstances surrounding the start of the
industry and its flawed parent (Le´cuyer 2006). The
transistor was invented at Bell Labs, AT&T’s research
arm. Under antitrust pressure, AT&T agreed to license
its transistor patents and produce transistors only for
itself and the government, which opened up the
commercial market for other firms. One of these was
founded by William Shockley, a leading researcher at
Bell Labs who shared the Nobel Prize for the
transistor. He founded his firm in Silicon Valley
where he was reared and his mother was still living.
His original goal was to produce silicon transistors
based on recent advances at Bell Labs, but he was a
dysfunctional manager and soon abandoned his plans
to concentrate on producing a complicated device of
his own invention. This led eight of his employees to
leave and found Fairchild Semiconductor to pursue
Shockley’s original vision, making Fairchild Semi-
conductor a sort of alter ego of AT&T. Fairchild
Semiconductor was immediately successful, and by
1966 it was the number two producer in the industry.
Thus, each of the clusters was characterized by a
very successful early entrant, which was expected to
spur the formation of spinoffs and thus a higher
percentage of spinoffs entrants in the clusters than
elsewhere. As reflected in Table 1, in each industry
the percentage of entrants that were spinoffs was
markedly higher in the clusters than elsewhere. In
autos, nearly half the 110 entrants in the Detroit area
were spinoffs versus 15% of the 603 entrants
elsewhere. In tires, over half of the 36 entrants
originating in Summit County were spinoffs versus
28% of the 67 entrants originating elsewhere in Ohio.
In semiconductors, a remarkable 93% of the 59
entrants in Silicon Valley were spinoffs versus 39%
of the 33 entrants elsewhere.
Not surprisingly given these figures, the most
prolific spawners of spinoffs were mainly the leading
firms in the clusters, as predicted. In autos, the four
early successful Detroit entrants, Olds, Buick/GM,
Cadillac, and Ford, were the top spawners of
spinoffs.6 They generated 22 spinoffs and another
19 spinoffs descended from them. Collectively, their
descendants accounted for 62% of the spinoffs that
6 One other firm in its different incarnations (it was reorga-
nized at one point) was tied with Cadillac and Ford for third
place behind Olds and Buick/GM in total number of spinoffs.
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entered in the Detroit area through 1924. In tires, the
top four spawners of spinoffs in Ohio included the top
three firms in Akron, Goodrich, Firestone, and
Goodyear. They had 13 spinoffs,7 and another nine
were indirect descendants founded by their ex-
employees (who first moved to other tire producers).
Collectively, their direct and indirect descendants
accounted for 52% of the spinoffs that entered within
100 miles of Akron. In semiconductors, Fairchild
Semiconductor alone spawned 14 spinoffs, more than
any firm in the industry, and another 17 spinoffs
descended from them. Furthermore, 14 other spinoffs
were founded by ex-employees of Fairchild Semi-
conductor or were descended from these spinoffs.
Collectively, Fairchild Semiconductor’s direct and
indirect descendants accounted for 82% of the
spinoffs that entered in Silicon Valley.
As predicted, spinoffs of the leading firms in the
clusters were a force in all three industries, especially
in autos and semiconductors. The early auto and
semiconductor leaders were predominantly diversifi-
ers, but most of them were displaced by spinoffs of
leading firms in the clusters (Klepper 2010). Among
the 16 automobile firms that entered after 1902 and
produced one of the top ten best-selling makes of
automobiles in one or more years through 1924, 12
were spinoffs descended from Olds, Buick/GM,
Cadillac, and Ford, and all but one was located in
the Detroit area.8 Among the 11 semiconductor firms
that entered after 1960 and made it into the ranks of
the top ICE producers in one or more years through
2002, seven were spinoffs located in Silicon Valley
that were directly or indirectly descended from
Fairchild Semiconductor.9 In tires, comprehensive
market share data for all but the top firms are lacking.
Instead, the longevity of firms is used as a proxy for
their performance. There was little turnover among
the very top Ohio firms, which generally were very
long-lived. However, spinoffs of the leading firms
were prominent among the other long-lived Ohio
entrants. Among the 16 Ohio firms other than the
early Akron leaders that survived 20 or more years,
seven were direct or indirect descendants of Good-
rich, Goodyear, and Firestone, and six of the seven
were located in Summit County.10
It was expected that clusters would be distinguished
by having a larger percentage of spinoffs entering at
large sizes than spinoffs elsewhere and startups in all
regions. Data from Thomas’ Register on the capital-
ization of firms were used to measure the size of auto
and tire firms when they entered. Each firm’s capital-
ization is reported in one of 11 intervals. Tables 2 and
3 report the percentage of spinoffs and startups in the
clusters and elsewhere with initial capitalization above
$1 million (the top category) and above $300,000 (the
top three categories).11 Consistent with expectations,
spinoffs in the clusters stand out. In autos, few firms
entered with capital of over $1 million, but the
percentage was higher for spinoffs in Detroit than for
spinoffs elsewhere and startups in Detroit and else-
where. The differences are more pronounced for initial
capital above $300,000—17.3% of the Detroit spinoffs






Cluster 47% (52/110) 58% (21/36) 93% (55/59)
Elsewhere 15% (88/603) 28% (19/67) 39% (13/33)
7 Goodrich acquired Diamond, which had one spinoff that is
included with Goodrich’s other four spinoffs.
8 Table 6 in Klepper (2009) lists the automobile firms that
periodically produced leading makes and their year of entry.
Among the 18 firms in Table 6 that entered after 1902, all but
Paige-Detroit and Dort made it into the top ten producers in
one or more years. Figure 4 in Klepper (2007) provides a
genealogy of the spinoffs descended from Olds, Cadillac, Ford,
and Buick/GM which reflects their 12 descendants that
produced a top ten best-selling make of automobile in one or
more years.
9 The 11 firms are listed under the category of later entrants in
Table 1 in Klepper (2009). Among the seven located in Silicon
Valley, Signetics, National, Intel, AMD, and LSI Logic were
spinoffs of Fairchild Semiconductor and AMI and VLSI
Technology were founded by ex-employees of Fairchild
Semiconductor (who had moved to other firms before founding
their spinoffs).
10 In ascending order of longevity, the 16 firms are Bucyrus,
Falls, Rubber Products, Victor, Star, Swinehart, Monarch,
Pharis, Seiberling, Amazon, Dayton, Denman-Myers, General,
Giant/Cooper, Mohawk, and Mansfield. Falls, Swinehart,
Seiberling, and General were spinoffs of Goodrich, Firestone,
and Goodyear, and Amazon, Denman-Myers, and Mohawk
were founded by ex-employees of these firms.
11 Table 2 is compiled from the data reported in Table 7 in
Klepper (2010). Table 3 is based on data reported in Buenstorf
and Klepper (2009) in Table 8, broken down by region.
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entered at this size versus 3.6–5.4% of firms in the
other three groups. In tires, only two firms, one
Summit County spinoff and startup, entered with
initial capital above $1 million. For initial capital
above $300,000, the spinoffs in Summit County stand
out—42.8% entered at this size versus 10.0–14.2% for
the other three groups of firms.
Klepper (2007, 2010) and Buenstorf and Klepper
(2009) analyzed the longevity of auto and tire
producers. Without controlling for firm backgrounds
and time of entry, firms in Detroit and Akron had
lower annual hazards of exit than firms elsewhere. In
autos, the lower hazard of the Detroit entrants was
confined to spinoffs located there, and in particular to
spinoffs of the leading firms that entered at larger
sizes (Klepper 2010). Buenstorf and Klepper (2009)
found that not only did the early tire entrants in
Summit County have lower hazards, but so did
subsequent entrants there. Similar to autos, the lower
hazards of the later entrants in Summit County were
confined to spinoffs located there, and in particular to
the ones that descended directly or indirectly from the
top three Akron firms and entered at larger sizes. The
performance of startups in both the Detroit area and
Summit County was not distinctive relative to
startups elsewhere, which casts doubt on whether
firms in the clusters benefitted from agglomeration
economies. Semiconductor firms in Silicon Valley
were also exemplary performers. But all of them were
spinoffs, so it was not possible to separate the effects
of background from regional effects related to
agglomeration economies.
The analysis that was conducted for the cotton
garment industry in Bangladesh focused on which
firms hired Desh Garments workers to set up their
production and the effect of hiring the Desh Garments
workers on the firm’s exports (Mostafa and Klepper
2010). Among the 664 entrants through 1988, 59
hired Desh Garments workers to set up their produc-
tion. Consistent with the predictions, the probability
of hiring a Desh Garments worker to set up produc-
tion was over threefold greater both for diversifiers
and college-educated founders. After controlling for
the effects of these backgrounds on the level of a
firm’s exports, hiring a Desh worker more than
doubled a firm’s exports as of 1995. The estimates
were robust to attempts to use instruments and other
measures of firm performance to control for the
effects of unobservable aspects of firms’ backgrounds
on their performance.
Mostafa and Klepper (2010) also analyzed a
secondary diffusion process in which workers in
another successful firm that itself hired Desh Gar-
ments workers to set up its production were hired by
entrants to set up and supervise their production. As
predicted, the types of firms that hired them were
similar to the types that hired the Desh Garments
workers, and hiring them improved an entrant’s
performance, but both effects were more muted than
hiring the Desh Garments workers. This would be
consistent with these workers also possessing valuable
tacit knowledge about production, but less thorough
and hence less valuable knowledge than the original
workers trained so extensively by Daewoo.
6 Questions and policy
The four clusters share a number of features. All
began with a single seed. In semiconductors and
Table 2 Percentage of automobile spinoffs and startups with the largest initial capital
Initial capital Detroit spinoffs (%) Other spinoffs (%) Detroit startups (%) Other startups (%)
[$1 million 7.7 1.1 0.0 1.3
[$300,000 17.3 4.4 5.4 3.6
Table 3 Percentage of tire spinoffs and startups with the largest initial capital
Initial capital (%) Summit spinoffs (%) Other spinoffs (%) Summit startups (%) Other startups (%)
[$1 million 7.1 0.0 7.1 0.0
[$300,000 42.8 10.0 14.2 11.8
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cotton garments, the seed was the main catalyst for
the growth of their clusters, whereas in autos and tires
other successful firms related to the seed also
catalyzed the growth of their clusters. Chance no
doubt played a critical role in the seeding of each of
the clusters and thus their location. Subsequently,
though, the evolution of the clusters followed a
similar path. The movement of employees from the
initial seed(s) to new firms either founded or shaped
by the employees propagated the original seed(s).
The new firms located close to where their founders
were previously working and living, which in the
case of spinoffs led to a buildup of firms around
successful early producers. Spinoffs with the right
pedigree or, in the case of the Bangladesh cotton
garment industry, new firms with the right heritage,
enabled the clusters to capture an increasing share of
their industry’s activity, fueling growth of the clusters
and their surrounding regions.
Spinoffs are by no means prominent in all
industries, which would help explain why some
industries do not exhibit much clustering. A quintes-
sential example is the TV receiver industry in the
USA, whose geographical evolution is considered in
Klepper (2005). About one-third of the entrants into
the TV receiver industry were diversifiers from the
radio industry. Radio firms were concentrated around
three cities in the USA: New York, Los Angeles, and
Chicago. Entrants into the TV receiver industry were
even more concentrated in these three cities—73% of
the 177 entrants into the TV receiver industry were in
these cities. In contrast, in autos, tires, and semicon-
ductors, entrants were far more dispersed, with only
about 20% locating in the clusters. So by rights, the
TV receiver industry should have evolved to have
been heavily concentrated geographically. However,
over time the industry became less concentrated
geographically, with first New York and then Los
Angeles losing all of its producers. The reason for
this development was that all of the leading TV
receiver producers were diversifiers from the radio
industry. No spinoffs made it into the ranks of the
leaders, and without spinoffs the industry de-agglom-
erated over time.
Numerous questions are raised by the proposed
spinoff account of clustering. Most fundamentally,
why do spinoffs occur—why do employees leave
successful firms to found their own firms in the same
industry? What do spinoffs inherit—what do
employees learn as a byproduct of their employment
that is useful in setting up their own firm? Why are
not all top-performing firms equally fertile sources of
spinoffs? Why, for example, did Fairchild Semicon-
ductor have so many more spinoffs than Texas
Instruments even though both followed extraordi-
narily similar technological paths during their for-
mative years (Klepper 2010)? Why do spinoffs locate
close to their parents? How do spinoffs spur the
growth of clusters—how do they result in added
activity in a cluster rather than just divert activity
from their parent? Even after controlling for various
firm and industry determinants of spinoffs, Klepper
(2010) found that the rate at which automobile and
semiconductor firms spawned spinoffs was higher in
the clusters. Why—is this indicative of some sort of
agglomeration economy? Last, why aren’t spinoffs
prominent in all industries?
I have broached a number of these questions in
recent joint papers (Carias and Klepper 2010; Klep-
per and Thompson 2010; Cheyre et al. 2011). Rather
than dwell on these questions, I close by discussing
broad policy implications of the findings. Four cases,
albeit extreme ones, hardly provide the basis for
making policy, but it is worthwhile reflecting on the
policy levers that might be tapped to promote the
kind of growth that the four clusters experienced.
The findings suggest that incumbent firms can play
a central role in training the next generation of
entrepreneurs in an industry. However, incumbents
are rarely involved in sponsoring their spinoffs, so
they have no incentive to play this training role.
Worse, spinoffs may try to hire employees from their
parents and may also compete with their parents for
sales. So it is natural for parents to want to suppress
spinoffs in any way possible. Intel is a case in point.
The founders of Intel, Robert Noyce and Gordon
Moore, were also founders of Fairchild Semiconduc-
tor, which was weakened by a steady defection of
employees to found their own firms. They vowed not
to experience that at Intel and according to some
accounts took draconian legal measures to intimidate
employees who sought to found their own firms
(Jackson 1997). One role that policy can play is to
prevent incumbents from such intimidation and, more
generally, to facilitate the formation of spinoffs.
The findings suggest that the mobility of workers
who possess valuable tacit knowledge plays a key role
in the creation of new firms that propel industries
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forward. Certainly this mobility can also weaken
incumbents, so it is a double-edged sword. But the
overall mobility of workers seems to have been key to
the tremendous growth experienced in each of the
clusters. In the USA, high-level employees commonly
sign covenants not to compete with their employers
for some specific length of time after leaving their
employ. With the exception of a few states in the
USA, most prominently California, most states allow
such covenants to be enforced (Gilson 1999), and their
enforcement appears to reduce mobility (Marx et al.
2009). The fact that Silicon Valley is in California is
suggestive that maybe the benefits of not allowing
such covenants to be enforced outweigh any harmful
effects on incumbents.
All four of the clusters began with a seed that
catalyzed their growth. This quite naturally raises the
question as to whether government policy could be
productively used to plant such seeds deliberately.
That is a far-reaching question that cannot be easily
answered. It is worth pointing out, however, that at
least in the case of the semiconductor industry, the
military was the largest customer early on for
advanced semiconductor devices, which proved to
be instrumental in the success of Fairchild Semicon-
ductor (Le´cuyer 2000), the seed for the Silicon Valley
semiconductor cluster. While the military had its own
objectives, it is instructive that the semiconductor
industry and the Silicon Valley cluster certainly owes
its success in part to a government entity. Taiwan’s
success in the semiconductor industry is perhaps even
more instructive about the planting of seeds by
government agencies. The first semiconductor com-
pany entered in 1980 and by the late 1990s Taiwan
was the fourth largest semiconductor producer in the
world behind the USA, Japan, and Korea. The
impetus for its entire industry was a research institute
sponsored by the government in the 1970s, and the
government was proactive in getting private compa-
nies to emerge from the institute at the start of the
industry in the 1980s (Mathews and Cho 2000).
One of the dividends of exploring the mechanisms
underlying clustering in the four industries is that it
focuses attention on novel policies. It also highlights
numerous questions regarding spinoffs that can be
productively addressed. Hopefully the nano-eco-
nomic exercise of dissecting the evolution of the
four clusters will encourage others to pursue a similar
tact and begin to get to the hub of how public policy
can promote the kind of growth that the four clusters
exemplify.
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